What is right isn't always popular.
In foreign policy, that can be a problem. To be more precise, foreign policy isn't crafted in a void, but rather in a political context. It isn't guided by the national interest of a state as much as by political interest of a leader and, alas, those two interests are not always synonymous. It is difficult to conceive of a system in which foreign policy is determined by entirely bureaucratic means, and it is questionable whether such a system would even be desirable. As long as the current system continues, the domestic public will (for better or worse) continue to play an important role in the formation of foreign policy. Perhaps the most important issue in world politics is ensuring that the public, not just a select diplomatic corps, possesses the kind of global cultural literacy necessary to make informed judgments regarding policy.
There is no single cause of international conflict. In some cases, self-interest may compel states to compete over limited resources. In some (rare) cases, there may be a clear moral imperative to act. But it seems improbable that all global conflict can be traced back to rational self-interest. There is little rational explanation, say, for genocide: why should Sudan exert resources and draw international criticism in order to destroy a sizable part of its own labor and product market. Some policies can only be explained by ignorance and misunderstanding, by clashing perspectives drawn from clashing cultural backgrounds. Conflict stems in large from differing etiquette, differing interpretations of history, differing values (and the differing governments they lead to), and the simple fear of differing cultures.
One of the core functions of diplomacy is to build cross-cultural understanding. Yet the diplomatic establishment, whether out of myopic ignorance or a curious code ethical code, serves only to develop this cultural literacy among a small number of diplomats and politicians; it entirely ignores the general populace, one of the most powerful players in the formation of foreign policy. The influence of the general populace on policy is most obvious within a democracy: leaders who support unpopular policies are ejected, as was the case with pro-Iraq Republicans in 2006. But authoritarian regimes are equally chained to popular demand: waging a war requires some modicum of popular support, and dissent against authoritarian regimes tends to come in more damaging forms (coups and revolutions).
The influence of the people on foreign policy tends to corrupt rational self-interest. To some degree, this is inevitable: the interest of individual citizens sometimes diverges from the interest of the state as a whole; most notably, it is rarely (if ever) in the best interest of citizens to sacrifice for future gains. But the far greater cause of corruption is simple ignorance. This is most visible (and most critical) in examining American (and European) policy towards China: most Americans seem unaware of the Eastern conception of human rights, or even of China’s collectivist mentality that reacts strongly and negatively to external criticism. Cultural literacy may or may not be able to reconcile substantially values, but by promoting respect and awareness of these differing values this literacy can combat the innate human suspicion of that which is foreign.
3 comments:
I pity da fool who ain't able to cross-culturally communicate!
"Conflict stems in large from differing etiquette, differing interpretations of history, differing values (and the differing governments they lead to), and the simple fear of differing cultures." Quite a striking theory. How do you know it to be true?
Not a whole lot can be proven in political science. It's nearly impossible to run controlled experiments and isolate variables, so I don't know that its true - but I think there are plenty of instances of conflict that can't be explained by people and states acting rationally.
The Falklands War strikes me as a prime example of this. Argentina invaded the Falklands to fuel nationalist sentiment. The islands were of little strategic value, and the average Argentinean would have gained nothing from retaking them.dMany terrorist groups wage war against cultures, not for security or economic gain (some, like the ETA, fight for independence, but in a climate where doing so wouldn't produce any tangible benefit. Spain is already a prosperous democratic state). The Rwandan genocide could have produced some material benefits for Hutus, but rationally speaking those benefits certainly wouldn't have outweighed the decimation of infrastructure, the erosion of the rule of law, and the economic devastation that the genocide very predictably lead to. Regardless of whether or not the American invasion of Iraq was wise, I think it was fueled in part by cultural misunderstandings: portions of the public could not distinguish between Iraq and Al Qaeda), and so supported the invasion as an extension of the "War on Terror."
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