Unfortunately, I wasn’t able to make it to our World Politics dinner and religious discussion tonight. But I’d still like to elaborate and rearticulate an apparently controversial statement I put forward to SilenceDogood following the University College event with Krista Tippett: that religion is inherently irrational. I think I can be slightly more specific. Not all elements of religion are irrational, but some defining elements of religion are; as a whole, religion is incompatible with strict rationality. We can discuss religion more productively by dissecting the term into the two distinct intellectual traditions it contains: philosophy, which is rational, and faith, which is not. Although many elements of religion are beneficial, the poorly defined idea of “religion” as a single tradition is dangerous. There are situations in which irrational behavior is destructive, but the catchall concept of religion lets irrationality leak into those arenas from which it should be insulated.
Neither philosophy nor faith can be proven absolutely and empirically, but the former is founded upon correlation and extrapolation from empirically evident truths. It is recognized as probable conjecture; it is justified, but only as far as it is supported by the observable world. Faith, in contrast, needs no correlation with the observable world. An article of faith is held as inherently true, and may be used as a standard by which the empirically observable world is judged and held, perhaps, as false. Most if not all religions contain reasonable, probable articles of philosophy: propositions on the nature of humanity, morality, and the universe. But for an intellectual tradition to constitute religion, it must also contain arbitrary articles of faith. In the Abrahamic religions, the primary article of faith is that the word of God is expressed in a particular text – not an assumption that we could deduce logically, considering the number of contradictory claims to the divine truth.
Religious moderates implicitly acknowledge that, while philosophy may inform our public life, faith must be contained within the private life. Articles of faith, they realize, often claim conflicting truths and preempt peaceful coexistence between peoples. But the concept of religion does not distinguish between rational and irrational articles; most moderates have only Krista Tippett’s childish sense that there is “good” and “bad” religion. In The End of Faith, Sam Harris makes a compelling argument that moderates are complicit in religious extremism: in defending the validity of religion through argument and example, moderates create a discourse in which religion as a whole is accepted unthinkingly. Patently ridiculous beliefs are considered valid and even encouraged because they are “religious,” while articles of religous philosophy that can and should be examined rationally are held as off-limits. Although the Christian views of human and divine nature are not unreasonable, most Christians could not give reasonable explanations. Because of the terms in which discourse is framed, valuing religion means devaluing reason: Philosophy and rationality are Nonoverlapping Magisteria ,but religion and rationality are not.
It’s still possible to make a strong case that religion is more beneficial than harmful. I differ from Harris and most of his militant atheist cohorts in my view of human nature, an article of philosophy. Whereas "anti-theists" are convinced that a world without religion would be governed by rational self-interest, I take a dimmer and more Hobbesian view of human nature as impulsive and myopic. Religion is a powerful normative pressure that can use irrational means to ultimately prevent irrational behavior; a flawed but perhaps necessary bargain.
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4 comments:
The only point I'd like to make is that religion cannot be defined in a way that is universally accepted. Just as there are different religions, there are also different ways to practice those religions. I highlight this because of your claim that rationality and faith cannot coexist. I agree that much of faith is intrinsically outside the realm of empirical observations, but I disagree that this means that they cannot coexist. With many more progressive leaning religions, interpretation of religious doctrine and sacred texts is largely or completely allegorical. Parables are not literal accounts of divine mandates but timeless sources for moral guidance. In a world full of gray areas, it is a complex task to make sense of a belief in terms of right and wrong, so instead it is much safer and more practical to employ such value judgements as guidelines rather than absolute law.
Of course, "ridiculous" religious beliefs will still exist. But the same can be said of ideological or academic views. Certain ideological and academic perspectives are as unconventional as their spiritual counterparts. I would argue that these views are equally as dangerous. Consider the view of those who deny the occurrence of the Holocaust. Those who believe in this line of thought, in addition to suffering from a baffling misinterpretation or understanding of history, are dangerous because they are condemned to repeat the lessons of history. Though religion can be perverted to support certain unconventional viewpoints, it is no less repulsive than the same ideological, social, and academic viewpoints.
First off, I want to agree entirely with your critique of much of modern atheism's over-valuing of reason and rationality. The assumption that all irrational behavior stems from religion is anything but flawed, given how irrationally closed-minded thinkers such as Harris are. However, in critiquing this way of thought, you also lend support to the same line of reasoning in discussing religion as a value system. You argue that religion is inherently irrational, but make no value judgment on that fact. Religion is irrational: so what? Humans are themselves irrational; it's a logical extension of the human experience. I, like you, buy more into the Hobbesean assumption of the state of nature's prevalence in the absence of true order. Reason, as a concept, does not carry the "big stick." The irrational human element is what wields it, more often blindly than not. Reason more often than not is valued simply because it is reason. Rarely do we ask the question: why reason? Reason can be used to fulfill horrific ends just as easily as irrationality. Creating ethnic tensions was in the interest of European colonial powers, as was the case with the Belgian intervention between the Hutus and Tutsis. Reason, in this case, not an irrational sense of altruism, created much of the conflict we see today. How did the Belgians not stand to gain from inflaming Hutu-Tutsi tensions? It allowed them to consolidate their authority over a region and preempt their role in dealing with potential ethnonationalist strife. Holding reason as God is just as deadly as identifying God with violence. Just like irrational faith, reason requires the same dulling sensation faith often gets through the moderate discourse Harris likes to critique.
Speaking as a religious person, I do not insinuate rationality in my faith. I can tell you why I believe, but it will mean nothing to you. To me, religion is personal. I have no obligation to base it in reason or empiricism. Why should I? Because it's rational? Why does it matter if it is or not? My beliefs are my own, and no one else's. I have no shame in what I see as truth, and owe it to no one but myself to hold these beliefs as true.
Andrew brings up a really interesting point (why reason?) but reason is the only means we have of acquiring knowledge, so what else is there?
I do agree however that rational or not, one's faith does not need to be justified to anyone but themselves.
BoVice:
The value of rationality derives from its utility. The organizing laws of the universe can never be objectively understood, but certain principles are more or less universally intersubjective. One can never absolutely prove the reflexive property, that when A equals B then B must equal A, but it is accepted as part of the nearly universal rational consensus.
Relating this discussion back to class, Tzvetan Todorov actually makes a compelling case for the utility of shared understanding. Columbus and the Indians were able to interact on the basis of an extremely minimal understanding of each other, and on occasion were able to establish a mutually beneficial exchange. But with an extremely minimal understanding, the two parties were only minimally able to pursue mutual benefit; they were unable to orient their actions with regards to each others' values. In a game such as the Stag Hunt, it is easy to instrumentalize interaction for mutual benefit when players understand the each others' value systems, but impossible to do so otherwise. The rational consensus is valuable merely because it is widespread.
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